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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Edward Boyce timely appeals from an Order of Revocation of Probation 
and Reducing Sentence and Commitment, wherein the district court revoked 
Mr. Boyce's probation and imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years 
fixed, which was reduced from a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, 
for which Mr. Boyce received for his guilty plea to grand theft. Mr. Boyce argues that 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when it refused to augment 
the record with transcripts of various hearings. Additionally, Mr. Boyce argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Boyce was being threatened with severe bodily injury because he owed 
approximately $2,500 in gambling debts. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 5-6.) 1 Mr. Boyce felt that his life could have been in danger if he 
failed to pay these debts. (PSI, p.22.) In order to pay these debts, Mr. Boyce stole 
approximately $2,500 from his former employer. (PSI, p.9.) 
Mr. Boyce was charged with grand theft and entered a guilty plea to that charge. 
(R., p.36.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with 
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.36-38.) Mr. Boyce successfully 
completed a period of retained jurisdiction and, in June of 2003, the district 
court suspended Mr. Boyce's sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.45-48.) 
1 The PSI was submitted in an electronic PDF format. For ease of citation, this brief will 
adhere to the PDF pagination. 
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In July of 2010, approximately seven years later, the State filed a motion for a 
probation violation, wherein the State alleged Mr. Boyce had changed his residence 
without his probation officer's permission, absconded from supervision, and had 
wrongfully taken $1,000 from his former employer. (R., pp. 51-53.) However, the State 
dismissed the allegation that Mr. Boyce had wrongfully taken funds from his former 
employer because it lacked evidence to pursue the allegation. (11/10/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.12-
15; 12/08/10 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.6.) The district court found Mr. Boyce had violated 
the terms of his probation for changing his residence without his probation officer's 
permission and absconded from supervision.2 (11/10/10 Tr., p.26, L.2 - p.27, L.2.) 
Thereafter, the district court ordered into execution the original sentence, but reduced it 
from ten years, with three years fixed, to a unified sentence of eight years, with three 
years fixed, pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Boyce timely appeals. 
(R., pp.84-87.) 
On appeal, Mr. Boyce's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend 
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be 
augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) 
The State objected to Mr. Boyce's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," 
(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme 
Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, denying Mr. Boyce's request for the transcripts. (Order Denying Motion to 
2 The specffic terms of probation for which the district court found Mr. Boyce had 
violated are not currently in the record on appeal. Accordingly, a motion to augment 
has been filed concurrently herewith. 
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1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an 
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues 
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Boyce filed Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of various 
hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a 
district court can considered all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal, 
Mr. Boyce is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for transcripts 
of the change of plea hearing held on November 19, 2002, the sentencing hearing held 
on December 12, 2002, the jurisdictional review hearing held on June 10, 2003, 
Admit/Deny hearing held on April 19, 2010, and the disposition hearing held on 
August 2, 2010. Mr. Boyce asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the 
issues addressed at the probation revocation hearing because they occurred before and 
after sentencing, and the district court can, therefore, rely on its memory of those 
hearings when it decided to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. Therefore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court. By Failing To Provide Mr. Boyce With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His 
Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I, §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole 
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing 
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I. C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
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before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
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death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be 
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the 
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 
416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Boyce fails to 
provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Boyce's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional 
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that 
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire 
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our 
review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis 
added)). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Boyce's Motion to Augment will 
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts 
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support the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural 
bar to the review of Mr. Boyce's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and 
therefore, Mr. Boyce should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Boyce With 
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
(to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that 
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72. 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
12 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel 
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 7 44 ( 1967) held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Boyce has 
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
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Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should 
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the 
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation. Counsel is also unable to 
advise Mr. Boyce on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Boyce is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Boyce his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Boyce had successfully completed seven years of probation, without any 
alleged probation violations. Towards the end of the seventh year of probation, 
Mr. Boyce discovered that his wife was having an affair. His wife then left him and took 
their three children. Mr. Boyce went camping to clear his mind and in the process he 
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violated two terms of his probation. However, those terms of probation were not willful 
violated and the actual violations were very technical. In light of the foregoing, the 
district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation 
Mr. Boyce asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Boyce concedes that he violated the terms his probation. Accordingly, he 
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the 
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (citing to 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994)). "When a district court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 
inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). 
"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a 
violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of 
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rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing to State v. Jones, 
123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 
1988)). "[l]f a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was 
beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order 
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the violation." Id. 
(citing to Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-
83)). "Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, 
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order." Id. 
As a preliminary point, Mr. Boyce successfully completed seven years of 
probation without any probation violation allegations. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.12-18.) 
Even though the district court found that Mr. Boyce violated his probation when 
he absconded, this violation is relatively benign when it is viewed in a larger context. 
Mr. Boyce's wife was having an affair with a police officer. (11/10/10 Tr., p.21, Ls.4-6.) 
His wife then left him and would not let him see his children. (12/08/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-7.) 
Mr. Boyce was understandable distraught over the situation, and decided to go camping 
to clear his head. (12/08/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Boyce informed his probation officer 
about his plans to go camping and his probation officer said that would be fine. 
(11/10/10 Tr., p.19, L.18 - p.20, L.3.) Mr. Boyce went camping for three weeks, but 
regularly returned and checked his messages and mail. (11/10/10 Tr., p.16, Ls.6-18.) 
During this period of time, Mr. Boyce never received any messages from his probation 
officer. (11/10/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-18.) Additionally, Mr. Boyce never missed any of his 
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scheduled probation appointments. (11/10/10 Tr., p.16, Ls.19-24.) Upon returning, he 
checked in with his probation officer at his next scheduled appointment. (11/10/1 0 
Tr., p.16, Ls.6-24.) Even the district court noted that this was merely a technical 
violation. (11/10/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-18.) IVlr. Boyce thought that he was in compliance 
with the terms of his probation while he was camping. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-12.) 
Mr. Boyce did not willfully change his address without written permission from his 
probation officer. While Mr. Boyce was camping, his landlord contacted his mother and 
to inform her that Mr. Boyce was behind on his rent. (PSI, p.130.) Without contacting 
Mr. Boyce, his mother and her mutual friend moved his personal property into a different 
residence. (11/10/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Boyce reported his change of residence 
to his probation officer the day after he returned from camping. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, L.24 
- p.19, L.14.) After telling his probation officer about the change of residence, the 
probation officer said "okay." (11/10/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-20.) Even though Mr. Boyce 
was supposed to inform his probation officer in writing before he changed residence. 
Mr. Boyce and his probation officer had developed a customary practice where 
Mr. Boyce would orally inform his probation officer after he had moved. (11/10/1 O 
Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.1.) 
In sum, Mr. Boyce had successfully completed seven years of probation and his 
two probation violations were very innocuous. In light of the foregoing, Mr. Boyce's 
probation was facilitating his rehabilitation and his probation violations, when viewed in 
a vacuum, did not indicate that he poses a threat to society. Therefore, the district court 
abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Boyce 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district 
court to place Mr. Boyce on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 13th day of January, 2012. 
/2--~,·=--
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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